A lot of small companies make real decisions in a group chat. Pricing, hiring, who gets paid, which vendor to fire. If someone else can read that chat, they can read your company.
On 26 June 2026 the FBI and CISA updated a public warning about Russian intelligence clusters taking over accounts on commercial messaging apps. The FBI says the actors compromised individual accounts “but not the” apps' encryption or the applications themselves (FBI and CISA PSA I-062626-PSA). The locks held. People handed over the keys.
Be clear on who is being targeted. The PSA names current and former government officials, military personnel, political figures, journalists and officials in Ukraine. Most small businesses are not on that list. But the tricks are cheap, they work on anyone, and criminals copy what state groups do. The checklist below costs you about twenty minutes.
What the attackers actually do
Two techniques show up in the public reporting.
Fake support. The actors pose as an automated support account for the app and ask for your verification code, your account PIN, or your Backup Recovery Key. The recovery key is the newer target. A sample message in the FBI's PSA tells users to set up backups, then paste their key into the chat. With the key, an attacker can read historical private and group messages and take over the account. The FBI says the key stays valid even if you register a new account on the same phone number. A new key blocks future backup downloads with the old one, but it does nothing about a backup the attacker already pulled (ic3.gov).
Linked device tricks. Signal and WhatsApp let you run one account on several devices by scanning a QR code. Google's Threat Intelligence Group documented attackers disguising malicious QR codes as group invites, security alerts or pairing instructions. Scan one and your account is linked to the attacker's device, so new messages go to both of you. Google called it a low-signature form of access, with no central detection watching for new linked devices, so it can go unnoticed for a long time (Google GTIG, February 2025). Google also says WhatsApp and Telegram are targeted with similar methods.
The checklist
- Audit linked devices today. In Signal, open Settings and look at Linked devices. In WhatsApp, it is under Linked devices in the menu. Remove anything you don't recognize. Do the same for every person who handles company business in chat. Menu names change between versions, so go by what your app shows. Then put a repeat on the calendar. Google recommends checking regularly.
- Never paste a code, PIN or recovery key into a chat. The FBI's list: real support doesn't ask for verification codes inside the app, and doesn't send links to “verify” or “restore” your account. Don't give out a verification code until you have confirmed the request came from the app's own channels. If someone messages you as support, that is the warning sign by itself.
- If you ever shared a recovery key, rotate it. The FBI says to generate a new Backup Recovery Key in Settings to invalidate one you shared. Remember that does not undo a backup that was already downloaded.
- Treat QR codes like links. Don't scan one that arrives in a message or on a web page claiming to be a group invite, an update, or a security alert. Linking a new device should be something you start, not something you are asked to do.
- Lock the phone properly. Google's advice is a long screen lock password with mixed case, numbers and symbols, rather than a short PIN. Keep the OS and the apps up to date.
- Turn on the second lock each app offers. Signal has a PIN and an optional Registration Lock. WhatsApp has two-step verification. Both are meant to stop someone re-registering your number. I couldn't open the vendors' help pages this week to quote exact menu paths, so check the current ones in each app.
- Agree on a way to confirm odd requests. If a “colleague” suddenly asks for money, a file or a login on chat, call them. A hijacked account looks like the real person.
If you think an account was taken
Unlink every device, re-register the app, and rotate the recovery key. Tell the people in your groups so they stop trusting messages from that account until you confirm it is you. Assume the history was readable and treat what was in it accordingly: change any password or link that was shared in the chat. The FBI asks targeted victims to report to IC3, a local FBI field office, or CISA at report@cisa.gov.
Where an outside test does not help
Honest note: none of this is what a Fast Pen Tests external test looks at. We test what is reachable from the internet, like your website and servers. We don't touch phones, chat apps or people. If your worry is a stolen chat account, the fix is the checklist above plus a short talk with your team. If you want to know what the internet can see of your company, that is a separate question, covered in what a $495 pen test covers.