Nobody Broke Signal's Encryption. People Got Phished.

By Andrew Owens |

If you've seen headlines about Signal being hacked this year, the short version is that its encryption was not broken. People were tricked into handing over the keys. That's a different problem, and it has a different fix.

The clearest official statement is the FBI and CISA public service announcement I-062626-PSA, dated June 26, 2026. It says Russian intelligence actors “compromised individual CMA accounts, but not the CMA's encryption or the application itself.” (CMA is the PSA's term for a commercial messaging app.) I haven't found a Signal blog post on this campaign. Signal's position, as reported by CyberInsider from its April 27 statement, is the same: it was not hacked, and the attackers got in by impersonating Signal support.

I'm not a Signal expert and this isn't a breaking-news post. It's a plain read of what the government says happened, and what it means if you run a small company.

What the attackers actually do

The FBI's June update, which builds on its March 20 announcement, describes a social engineering campaign, not a technical exploit. The March notice says it has led to unauthorized access to “thousands of individual CMA accounts.” The steps are simple:

  1. The attacker messages you pretending to be an automated support account.
  2. The message pushes you toward a link or toward backing up your messages.
  3. They ask for your verification code and your account PIN.
  4. In the newer version, they also ask for your Backup Recovery Key.

That last item is the nasty one. According to the FBI, with a Backup Recovery Key an actor can read your historical private and group messages and take over the account. The key also stays valid if you later register a new account on the same phone number. Generating a new key invalidates the old one for future backup downloads, but it does not help if the attacker already downloaded a backup.

The March notice describes a second route too. The attacker impersonates someone you know and sends a link or QR code. If you follow it, they link their own device to your account, and then both of you receive your messages.

The linked device trick is quiet

Google Threat Intelligence Group documented this in February 2025. Attackers made malicious QR codes that link your account to a device they control. They also altered group invite pages so the “join group” button actually triggered a device-linking link. Google called it “a low-signature form of initial access” and warned a compromise can go unnoticed for long stretches.

Nothing breaks, nothing crashes, and nobody gets a scary pop-up. Messages just show up in two places. That's why it matters that the cryptography is fine. The attacker is a legitimate endpoint.

Google also said the same techniques extend to WhatsApp and Telegram. This isn't only a Signal story.

Is this about your company?

Probably not directly, and I'd rather say so than scare you. The FBI names the targets: current and former US and international officials, military personnel, political figures, journalists, and key officials in Ukraine. It describes people of high intelligence value to Russia. It tracks the activity as UNC5792 and UNC4221 and ties it to FSB officers and Russian military services.

If you sell software to a government agency, advise a defense contractor, or do journalism, take it more seriously. If you're a ten person firm that uses Signal to coordinate with your cofounder, you're not the stated target. But the tricks aren't exotic. A fake support message that asks for a code works on anyone, and criminals copy what works.

What to do this week

  1. Never give out a verification code, PIN or recovery key. The FBI's rule is: don't provide a code until you confirm the request is legitimate, and note that real support doesn't ask for verification codes in the app and doesn't send “verify” or “restore” links. Nobody on the other end of a chat needs your recovery key.
  2. Audit your linked devices. Google's advice is to check the Linked devices section in settings regularly. Anything you don't recognize, remove it. Do this on every account your team uses, including WhatsApp.
  3. Be suspicious of QR codes and invite links. That includes “update” prompts and group invites that arrive from a contact. Confirm through another channel, like a phone call, before you scan.
  4. Turn on Registration Lock if it isn't on. It was one of the protections noted in coverage of Signal's own guidance, but check Signal's current help pages for the exact setting.
  5. If you shared a Backup Recovery Key, generate a new one in settings. It helps for future downloads. It won't undo a backup that was already taken, so assume those old messages are exposed.
  6. Know who to tell. Report incidents to your own security or IT contact, file a complaint at ic3.gov, or contact your local FBI field office.

Longer term, decide what your company will and won't decide over a chat app. A message thread is a fine place to say “lunch?” and a poor place to approve a wire transfer without a second check.

Where a pen test does and doesn't help

Honestly, it doesn't help here. An external penetration test looks at what's reachable from the internet: your website, your APIs, your exposed services. It doesn't test your phones, your chat apps or your people. For this threat, the control is habits and settings. For a related look at why rules and checklists trail real attacks, see our post on why cyber rules lag behind attacks.

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